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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH HADLEY, a Minor, 
By REX HADLEY, his Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiff and Apellant 
vs. 
DOUGLAS J. WOOD, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9007 
This action was commenced by Ralph Hadley, a min-
or, through his guardian ad litem, against the defendant 
to recover damages for personal in juries incurred by him 
as a result of the defendant's negligent operation of an 
automobile. <R.l,2) The defendant set up the defenses 
of unavoidable accident and contributory negligence. 
<R.6> 
The collision occurred in a residential area of Ogden 
City, Utah, on the west side of Polk Avenue in front of 
the Wasatch elementary school, shortly before 3 o'clock, 
Sunday afternoon, on the 9th day of January, 1955. (Tr. 
8,13,39) The :Hadley boy with a companion, Steven 
Branz, were sleigh riding down the hill in front of the 
Wasatch School. (Tr. 130) At that time Ralph Hadley 
was 6 years and 1 month old (Tr. 142) and Steven Branz 
was 8 years old. (Tr. 133) Polk Avenue runs north and 
south. The Wasatch School is on the east side of Polk 
Avenue. <Tr. 9) Hadley, lying down on the sleight of 
Steven Branz, slid down the hill in front of the Wasatch 
School traveling in a westerly direction and across Polk 
Avenue. The defendant Wood, driving his automobile 
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alone in a southerly direction along Polk Avenue, collided 
with the boy and sleigh on the west side of said Polk 
Avenue. The boy was pinned between the front part of 
the undercarriage of the car and the snow bank. <Tr. 
130) He incurred the following injuries: Fracture of pel-
vis, fracture of right arm above elbow, fracture of lower 
left leg, fracture of left femur or thigh, fracture of right 
femur. <Tr. 84), and as a result thereof is afflicted in the 
lower left extremity with a 15 per cent permanent partial 
disability (Tr. 90) Medical expenses incurred amount to 
$1,428.25. 
At the close of plaintiff's case defendant made a mo-
tion for "a judgment of non-suit, dismissing the com-
plaint," (Tr. 155) which was denied. <Tr. 156) 
The jury found the issues in favor of the defendant, 
no cause for action. <Tr. 209) 
I:'laintiff moved the court for a new trial, <R. 16) 
which was denied. <R.l7) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. 
The only issue before the jury other than damages 
was the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff being 
6 years old at the time is conclusively presun1ed to be in-
capable of contributory negligence. This point will be de-
veloped at number II hereafter. 
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The evidence established the following conclusive, 
unrebutted facts: 
1. Sunday, the 9th day of January, 1955, was a cold 
day with clear visibility. (Tr. 11,18,44,120) 
2. There was snow in the area of the Wasatch 
School by Polk Avenue. (Tr 11,130) 
3. Polk Avenue was slick and icy. (Tr.11,22,35,78) 
4. The streets were icy in the entire area. Tr.13) 
5. There were children sleigh riding in the area. 
(Tr.59,71,78,124) 
6. There were sleigh tracks running east to west in 
front of the Wasatch School to the curbing of Polk Ave-
nue. (Tr.l2,27,45,46) 
7. The distance of the sleigh riding hill was 122 
feet. Tr.l38) 
8. The sleigh riding hill was steep. (Tr.1 0,26,45, 
46) 
9. The width of Polk Avenue was 35 feet. (Tr.l9) 
10. There was a clear, unobstructed view from where 
the defendant entered the shool area on Polk Avenue to 
where the children were sleigh riding. (Tr.26,27) 
11. The distance from where the defendant entered 
the school area to where the children were sleigh riding 
was on half block. (Tr.l6) 
12. The Wasatch School is the only structure on the 
east side of Polk Avenue. (Tr.l8) 
13. There were no obstructions to view between de-· 
fendant and plaintiff when he entered the school area. 
(Tr.44) 
14. The school area is surrounded by play areas. 
<Tr.9) 
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15. The approaches to the school area are marked 
by warning signs. (Tr.10) 
16. The defendant could have seen the Hadley boy 
on the hill. ( Tr .26,27, 131 ) 
17. The defendant had ample time to stop his ve-
hicle at the speed he testified he was going had he seen 
the plaintiff on the hill. (Tr.28,131) · 
18. Traffic conditions were light. (Tr.30) 
19. The Hadley boy was struck by the front of the 
defendant's automobile. (Tr. 44,134) 
20. It was the practice of some children to sleigh 
ride down the hill in front of the Wasatch School and pro-
ceed west across Polk Avenue. (Tr.72,73) 
21. Immediately after the collision the defendant ad-
mitted he had just run over a youngster. <Tr.76~77) 
Steven Branz, who was sleigh riding with the plaintiff at 
the time of the collision, gives this account of the event, 
A. "Well, we were going down the hill from the top 
and there was a little jump at the top so when 
you went down, you made a jump just dropped a 
couple of feet and start down the hill. As we went 
down, we watched for cars at each end of _the 
street and when we were coming up, I was ahead 
of Ralph, and we were just about to the top and 
he started down and there was a car and I shout-
ed at him and he kept going and the car tried to 
stop and it skidded and they both met, more or 
less, as it hit the snowbank. 
Q. When they met, was it the front part of the car 
that met with Ralph on the sleigh? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was the car when you first saw it, do you 
remember? 
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A. Well, it was by the corner before, a little past the 
corner. 
Q. A little past, toward the school? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Boughton Street, is that the name of the street 
by the school? 
A. Yes." (Tr.l30,131) 
The defendant testified and admitted the following 
facts: 
1. That he knew roads were slick. (Tr.l68) 
2. That there were no cars on the street. (Tr.l69) 
3. That there were a few children around the area 
of the Wasatch School. (Tr.l69) 
4. That the visibility was good. (Tr.l70) 
5. That he was aware he was approaching a school 
area. (Tr.l81) 
6. That he saw some children on the side of the 
hill. (Tr.l81) 
7. That he did not look at the children again after 
he had once seen them. (Tr.l83) 
8. That had he seen the Hadley boy sooner he 
could have avoided the accident. (Tr.l91) 
9. That had he seen the boy coming down the hill 
he would have brought the car under control. (Tr.l95) 
The following is quoted from the testimony of the 
defendant: 
"Q. Were you aware of the fact that you were ap-
proaching a school when you came into this 
Wasatch School area? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did you notice any children in that vicinity? 
A. As I recall, there were some few children up on 
the side of the hill there. 
Q. And what side of the hill are you referring to? 
A. That would be up on the east side." <Tr.l81) 
"Q. Did you notice any other on the west side? 
A. No, I didn't notice any on the west side. 
Q. What were these children doing that were on the 
east side? 
A. They were just there. They were playing. I don't 
know what they were doing. I was watching the 
road. 
Q. Then you didn't slacken your speed when you 
got to this area where the school was. Is that 
correct? 
A. I don't recall." (Tr.l82) 
"Q. And where were you particularly on Polk Avenue 
when you first saw these children at the Wasatch 
School? 
A. Oh, they were off about like that (indicating). 
THE COURT: Will you indicate again? 
A. Off on an angle, that is as near as I can remem-
ber, it has been four years. 
THE COURT: The record may show that he indi-
cates about a thirty degree angle from the front. 
* * * 
Q. Did you see a child on a sleigh coming down that 
hill? 
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A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you look, did you keep looking in the area 
where you had seen those children by the W a-
satch School, did you keep them in your vision 
after you passed? 
A. There was snowbanks on the side of the road and 
the road was clear and I was watching the road. 
Q. You were not watching these children then? 
A. No. 
Q. Good visibility, you said, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the first time you saw young Hadley was 
when he was just coming over what you call the 
top of the snowbank? 
A. Yes." (Tr.183 and 184) 
"Q. Had you driven over that general area before, 
Mr. Wood? 
A. What do you mean, "before," ever? 
Q. Yes. ever. 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many times, do you recall? 
A. No, I don't recall." (Tr.l90) 
"Q. If you had seen him coming down this hill and 
were aware that he was coming down, could you 
have avoided the accident. Isn't it possible that 
you could have? 
A. Well, if I had seen him coming down the hill, 
possibly yes." (Tr.l91) 
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"Q. And once again, isn't it true that if you had seen 
the boy come down that hill, you could have 
avoided that accident? I think you have answered 
that once before. 
A. If I had seen the boy coming down that hill, and 
had known the boy was going to go across the 
street, it is possible that I could have avoided the 
accident." (Tr.l94) 
"Q. Mr. Wood, if you had seen that boy coming down 
the hill, you wouldn't have slackened your speed 
or have tried to do anything until you saw him 
come out of the snowbank. Is that right? 
MR. MIDGLEY: I object to that on the ground that 
it is argumentative. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. Answer 
the question if you can. 
A. Will you state that question again, please. 
Q. In other words, if you had seen that boy coming 
down the hill, you still would have done nothing 
with reference to the control of your automobile 
because you would have assumed that he was not 
going to come across the street. Is that right? Is 
that right? 
A. Well, you don't normally jam your car in a snow-
bank unless you have an idea that something is 
going to come in the road, not knowing whether 
the boy would be going into the road, I don't 
know that you would swerve, would you? 
Q. You wouldn't have applied your brakes, you 
wouldn't have tried to bring your car under con-
trol, under those circumstances? 
A. If I had seen the boy coming, yes. 
Q. You would? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. So if you had seen him sooner, it is possible that 
you could have avoided the accident then? 
A. It is possible. 
Q. That is all." (Tr.195) 
"Q. Isn't it true that you, that you didn't keep a look-
out for these children, once you knew that they 
were there. Isn't that true? 
A. I was keeping my eyes on the road. 
Q. You were not paying any attention to the chil-
dren, you were keeping your eyes on the road. 
Right? 
A. That is a normal thing to do. 
Q. Well, that is what you were doing, is it not? 
A. As I remember, I was watching the road. 
Q. That is all." (Tr.l97 and 198) 
The answer sets out two defenses, that of contribu-
tory negligence of Ralph Hadley and that of unavoidable 
accident. The first is without merit as a matter of law. 
The second is eliminated by the admission of the defend-
ant. The jury must render a verdict on evidence not on 
bias, sympathy or conjecture. The facts establish as ·a 
matter of law the negligence of the defendant in failing 
to keep a proper lookout and in failing to keep his auto-
mobile under control, which negligence was the proximate 
cause of the injuries of the plaintiff. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
"No. IO <R.II) A person who is observing due 
care for his own safety, has a right to assume 
that others are possessed of normal facilities of 
sight and hearing and that they will use them 
in exercising ordinary care for their own safety 
and the safety of others; and he has the right to 
rely on that assumption, unless, in the exercise 
of due care, he observes or should observe some-
thing to warn him to the contrary." 
This imposed in effect the duty of due care on the 
plaintiff. 
"No. II <R.ll) The proximate cause of an in-
jury is that cause which, in natural and contin-
uous sequence, unbroken by any efficient inter-
vening cause, produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is 
the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the in-
jury. 
It may operate directly or through interme-
diate agencies or through conditions created by 
such agencies. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only 
one proximate cause of an injury, consisting of 
only one factor, one act, or the conduct of only 
one person. To the contrary, the acts and omis-
sions of two or more persons may work concur-
rently as the efficient cause of an injury, and in 
such a case, each of the participating acts or om-
IO 
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missions is regarded in law as a proximate cause 
and both may be held responsible." 
The jury was thus told both may be held respon-
sible. 
"No. 13 (R.ll) When the negligent acts or 
omissions of two or more persons, whether com-
mitted independently or in the course of jointly 
directed conduct, contribute concurrently, and 
as proximate cause, to the injury of another, 
each of such persons is liable. This is true re-
gardless of the relative degree of the contribu-
tion. 
Where such concurrent negligence exists, 
it is no defense for one of such persons that some 
other person, not joined as a defendant in the ac-
tion, participated in causing the injury. 
Even if it should appear to you that negli-
gence of that other person was greater in either 
its wrongful nature or its effect." 
The effect of this instruction was that where there 
is concurring negligence each is liable. 
There was no issue of concurrent or contributory 
negligence raised by this case, nor was the plaintiff under 
a duty of due care as defined in our law. 
Nelson et ux v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, Limited. 
Smith et ux v. same, 99Ut 129, 104 P2d 225, in quoted: 
"It has been generally recognized that children 
of tender years are so far undeveloped as to be re-
lieved of the charge of negligence; that during 
another period in their infancy there is rebut-
table presumption against their capacity to un-
derstand and avoid danger; and that in the later 
years of infancy there is rebuttable presumption 
that they are chargeable with the same degree of 
I I 
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care as are adults .. Ordinarily a child under seven 
years of age is conclusively presumed not guilty 
of contributory negligence.xxx" 
This case quoted with approval. 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Volume I, Section 
99 (a), as follows: 
"xxxThe question as to whether a child's capa-
city is such that it rnay be chargeable with con-
tributory negligence is a question of fact for the 
jury, unless so young and immature as to require 
the court to judicially know that it could not 
contribute to its own injury or be responsible for 
its acts, xxx. Where the infant is under fourteen 
years of age, the burden rests upon the defendant 
to rebut the legal presumption of incapability of 
contributory negligence.xxx" 
The above Arrowhead case was cited with approval 
in the case of Morby v. Rogers, 252 P2d 231, Ut; and was 
cited as authority for holding a child 2 years and 8 
months is conclusively presumed not guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in the case of Le Daux et ux v. Martinez 
et al, 254 P2d 685, NM. 
Where the only issue regarding liability properly 
before the jury was whether the defendant was negligent 
the effect of instructions indicating "both may be held re-
sponsible" and "each of such persons is liable" is error. 
Although the court sought to properly state the 
law in instruction 14 ( R.ll ) to the effect that, "the law 
conclusively concludes that the child is incapable of the 
judgment and attentiveness necessary to bring his own 
misconduct to the magnitude that would justify an adult 
12 
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otherwise liable in successfully asserting contributory 
negligence as a defense." It is clear that in view of the 
conclusive state of the evidence and the erroneous instruc-
tions, it is clear that the jury based its verdict on the 
negligence of the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant prays that the case be remanded for a new 
trial with instructions to the trial court to direct a verdict 
for appellant and submit the case on the question of dam-
ages; or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
13 
LAVAR E. STARK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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